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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Where a court stands depends on where that court sits. External context 
generally shapes the law and politics of judicial institutions. For any court, key 
contextual factors may include, for instance, political actors and institutions that 
must enforce judicial rulings and that may react to unwanted rulings with ‘court 
curbing’ measures; other courts with which the court cooperates or competes; 
members of the legal field,1 including the lawyers and litigants who bring cases 
and the scholars who interpret the court’s jurisprudence; and the broader 
sociopolitical or geopolitical context that may influence prevailing attitudes 
about governance by judges. In one external context, political actors may accept 
and even embrace assertions of judicial power. In another, political actors may 
suppress the judiciary. In one external context, a high court may rely on 
widespread support from lower courts. In another, a high court may struggle to 
assert its authority vis-à-vis other courts. And in one external context, a court 
may benefit from the support of a burgeoning “legal field” that generates cases 
and promotes the acceptance of new doctrines, whereas in another, a court may 
find itself with few friends and even fewer cases. 
External contextual factors have played a profound role in shaping the law 
and politics of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).2 Indeed, it is hard to 
conceive of a set of more influential causal factors. The ECJ has emerged as the 
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 1.  On the concept of legal fields, see generally Pierre Bourdieu & Richard Terdiman, The Force 
of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1987); Yves Dezalay & 
Mikael Rask Madsen, The Force of Law and Lawyers: Pierre Bourdieu and the Reflexive Sociology of 
Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 433 (2012). 
 2.  Naming conventions for the EU’s courts changed with the Lisbon Treaty. The EU’s high court 
is formally referred to as the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The lower court, formerly known as the 
Court of First Instance, is now known as the General Court. The EU judiciary as a whole, 
encompassing the ECJ, the General Court, the EU Civil Service Tribunal, and other specialized courts 
that the EU may establish, is known as the Court of Justice of the European Union, or CJEU. This 
unfortunate naming convention uses the singular—“Court” in CJEU—for what is actually a plural: a 
judicial system made up of multiple courts. 
KELEMEN_1-8 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2016  11:10 AM 
118 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:117 
most powerful supranational court in world history, achieving a status more 
akin to that of a domestic constitutional court than to other international or 
supranational courts, such as the others discussed in this issue. In terms of the 
measures of authority,3 the ECJ has clearly achieved extensive authority. Its 
rulings are accepted not only by the parties to the case and “compliance 
partners,”4 such as executive branch officials, administrative agencies, and 
judges, but also by a much broader legal field encompassing scholars, legal 
practitioners, and other actors who advise individuals, governments, and firms 
on what the law requires. The distinctive achievements of the ECJ have 
depended crucially on its external context, a context which has been much more 
conducive to judicial empowerment than the contexts surrounding other 
international courts. To be sure, factors internal to the ECJ itself—relating to its 
internal structure, operations, and its strategic behavior—have been necessary 
to its success, but such internal factors could only help the Court secure such 
extensive authority because the Court already enjoyed a favorable external 
context. 
The introduction to this issue5 highlights three categories of external 
contextual factors—institution-specific context, constituencies context, and 
geopolitical context—that affect the development of an international court’s 
authority. Aspects of each of these three categories have been crucial to the 
development of the ECJ’s extensive authority. First, the ECJ benefited from an 
overarching geopolitical context—including its linkage to the project of regional 
integration in Europe, the institutional setting of the early European 
Community, and the broad trend toward the judicialization of politics in 
Europe—that was highly supportive of the expansion of judicial authority. 
Second, the core subject matter of the Court’s early jurisdiction, which centered 
on adjudicating disputes pertaining to the European Community’s single 
market, allowed the ECJ to focus initially on issues of relatively low political 
salience and thus to develop its jurisprudence protected behind a veil of 
technocratic obscurantism. Third, the ECJ’s core constituencies—national 
governments, national courts, and members of the European Union (EU) legal 
field—tended to be supportive of judicial empowerment. Together, these 
aspects of the ECJ’s external context provided a highly supportive environment 
in which the Court could develop its jurisprudence and gradually extend its 
judicial power during its first few decades of existence. Rarely do international 
courts enjoy such favorable external contexts. Indeed, even the ECJ itself today 
faces a more threatening external context than it did in past decades. 
Although the ECJ’s external context remains broadly supportive of its 
authority, external changes over the past decade present the Court with a new 
 
 3.  Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Mikael Rask Madsen, How Context Shapes the 
Authority of International Courts, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.1, 2016, at 9–12. 
 4.  KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS, RIGHTS 
53 (2014). 
 5.  Alter, Helfer & Madsen, supra note 3. 
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set of challenges. Declining public support for the project of European 
integration has negative implications for the Court. The expansion of the scope 
of EU law into more sensitive policy fields draws the ECJ into increasingly 
contentious political debates. Rumblings of anti-ECJ backlash among a number 
of the Court’s core constituencies, including some national governments, 
national judiciaries, and members of the European legal field, portend dangers 
on the horizon. Thus, although the Court’s authority is in many respects more 
extensive than ever before, the ECJ faces a number of new risks in its external 
context and it must tread carefully as its terrain grows more treacherous. 
Part II of this article analyzes the impact of geopolitical context on the 
development of the Court’s authority. This article shows that the early Court 
benefited from a very supportive geopolitical context, but recent changes have 
rendered its geopolitical context more threatening. Part III analyzes how the 
EU’s initial focus on the single market as a core subject matter supported the 
extension of its authority and how the spread of the Court’s jurisdiction to more 
controversial subject matters poses new challenges to this authority. Part IV 
focuses on the ECJ’s constituencies, highlighting the impact of member 
governments, national courts, and the broader European legal field on the 
development of the Court’s authority. In particular, recent changes in the ECJ’s 
constituencies context present the Court with new risks. 
II 
GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT 
In its first few decades of operation, the ECJ benefited from an overarching 
geopolitical context that supported the expansion of the Court’s authority. The 
ECJ’s assertion of judicial power at the supranational level and its promotion of 
various EU rights were very much in keeping with regional geopolitical 
trends—above all, the political drive for regional integration in Europe and the 
judicialization of politics.6 The geopolitical context surrounding the ECJ 
remains broadly supportive of its authority today, but recent trends, in 
particular declines in public support for the EU, do raise cause for concern. 
The first overarching political trend supporting the ECJ’s drive to enhance 
its authority was the project of regional integration in postwar Europe. Support 
for increasing an international court’s authority is influenced by the degree of 
support for the regional body with which the court is associated.7 In postwar 
Europe, national governments of West European democracies demonstrated an 
abiding commitment to the project of European integration, particularly to the 
 
 6.  On the political drive for regional integration in postwar Europe, see generally DESMOND 
DINAN, EUROPE RECAST: A HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (2004); ANDREW MORAVCSIK, 
THE CHOICE FOR EUROPE: SOCIAL PURPOSE AND STATE POWER FROM MESSINA TO MAASTRICHT 
(1998). On the trend to the judicialization of politics, see generally Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone, The 
New Constitutional Politics of Europe, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 397 (1994); ALEC STONE SWEET, 
GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000). 
 7.  See Erik Voeten, Public Opinion and the Legitimacy of International Courts, 14 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 411, 413–14 (2013).  
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aim of establishing a common market.8 Whereas enthusiasm for the integration 
project certainly went through peaks and troughs over time and varied across 
member states, all member states, broadly speaking, remained committed to 
regional economic integration from the 1950s onward, and, in a series of Treaty 
revisions, all agreed to further steps toward political integration.9 
The establishment of the ECJ’s authority is inseparable from Europe’s push 
for integration. The ECJ formed an integral part of the institutional architecture 
of the European Communities and, later, the EU. In short, the Court was part 
of the package of European integration, and states and other actors that wished 
to reap the benefits of regional integration had to accept the Court and its 
authority as part of that overall package. They might have resisted 
implementing particular rulings and occasionally called for reforms to rein in 
the Court, but, so long as they wanted to be part of the EU, they could not 
unilaterally reject the Court’s growing authority. Member states recognized that 
they needed the ECJ in order to enhance the credibility of their commitments 
to integration and to solve the formidable collective-action problems the 
member states faced.10 
Moreover, the institutional structure of the EU provided a context 
conducive to judicial empowerment. The EU is a political system in which 
power is highly fragmented. In the EU, as in other political systems, political 
fragmentation encourages judicial empowerment.11 In the EU, power is 
fragmented both horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, EU power is 
fragmented among the European Commission, the Parliament, and 
governments in the Council, all of which play a role in adopting new EU 
legislation. Power is also fragmented vertically between EU lawmakers and the 
national administrations that implement most EU policies. This bidirectional, 
political fragmentation, therefore, gives the ECJ space to play an active policy 
role with little fear of concerted political reprisals. Assembling the large 
political coalitions necessary to rein in the ECJ is difficult, and this insulates the 
Court against political attacks. When it comes to reining in the ECJ through 
 
 8.  MICHELLE P. EGAN, SINGLE MARKETS: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN EUROPE AND THE 
UNITED STATES 8–13 (2015). On European leaders’ renewed focus on market integration from the 
1980s onward, see generally, NICOLAS JABKO, PLAYING THE MARKET: A POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR 
UNITING EUROPE, 1985–2005 (2006).   
 9.  See generally MORAVCSIK, supra note 6 (reviewing the major treaty revisions that advanced 
the process of European integration from the 1950s through the 1990s). 
 10.  See MORAVCSIK, supra note 6, at 67–76.  
 11.  On the relationship between political fragmentation and judicial power, see TOM GINSBURG, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 256, 261 (2003); R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW & REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 24–28 (2011). See 
generally MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981); John 
Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 55–60 (Summer 
2002) (explaining that political fragmentation allows courts to independently engage in policy 
formulation); Keith Whittington, Legislative Sanctions and the Strategic Environment of Judicial 
Review, 1 INT’L J. CON. L. 446 (2003); Keith Whittington & R. Daniel Kelemen, Establishing and 
Maintaining Judicial Independence, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 99 (Keith 
Whittington et al. eds., 2008).  
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legislation or treaty amendment, member states face a “joint decision trap,”12 a 
decision-making deadlock that arises when parties who would be adversely 
affected by a decision are able to veto it.  To override an ECJ interpretation of 
the EU Treaties, member states must agree unanimously. To override an ECJ 
interpretation of secondary legislation, member states must pass new 
legislation, which under the most common legislative procedure used today13 
requires the introduction of a proposal by the Commission, a qualified majority 
in the Council, and a majority in the European Parliament. As long as one or 
more crucial veto players in the EU legislative process support the ECJ’s 
assertions of authority, they can shield the Court from political attacks.14 
The fragmentation of power has not only insulated the Court against 
political reprisals but has also generated incentives for lawmakers to expand the 
Court’s role. The fragmentation of political authority creates principal–agent 
problems between EU lawmakers, the principals, and the national 
administrations that implement most EU law, the agents. Because EU 
lawmakers cannot necessarily trust national administrations to faithfully 
implement and enforce EU law, they frequently craft legislation that stipulates 
in detail the actions their agents must take and that invites courts to play an 
oversight role to ensure that these agents fulfill their mandates.15 In other 
words, EU lawmakers frequently write legislation that invites the ECJ to play a 
central role in governance. 
More generally, the fact that the EU has such a limited administrative 
capacity of its own has long encouraged lawmakers to rely on judicialized 
modes of governance.16 In effect, EU lawmakers treat judicialization as a 
functional substitute for their lack of a strong, centralized administrative 
bureaucracy. Because they cannot deploy vast legions of Eurocrats to monitor 
and enforce EU policies, EU lawmakers have conscripted private litigants into 
acting as the eyes, ears, and long arm of Brussels, encouraging the litigants to 
bring enforcement actions before national and EU courts.17 
A second aspect of the geopolitical context of postwar Europe also 
facilitated the development of the ECJ’s authority: in the postwar era, 
democratic political systems across Western Europe were experiencing a 
substantial judicialization of politics domestically.18 The fact that fascist parties 
 
 12.  See Fritz W. Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons From German Federalism and 
European Integration, 66 PUB. ADMIN. 239, 239 (1988). For an updated account of this dilemma, see 
Fritz W. Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited, 44 J. COMMON. MKT. STUD. 845 (2006). 
 13.  The so-called “Ordinary Legislative Procedure” is outlined in the Consolidated Version of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 289, Oct. 26, 2012 O.J. (326), [hereinafter 
TFEU]. 
 14.  See R. Daniel Kelemen, The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in the European 
Union, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 43, 47 (2012) (discussing the ECJ’s high degree of insulation from 
political reprisals). 
 15.  KELEMEN, supra note 11, at 25–26. 
 16.  Id. at 27. 
 17.  Id. at 27–28. 
 18.  See generally STONE SWEET, supra note 6; Shapiro & Stone, supra note 6. 
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in Germany and elsewhere had used their control of Parliament to extinguish 
democracy called into question the parliamentary supremacy model that had 
prevailed in European democracies. Many member states supplanted this 
traditional parliamentary supremacy model with a “new constitutionalism” 
involving a more expansive role for the judiciary in reviewing legislative action 
and safeguarding fundamental rights.19 Powerful constitutional courts were 
established in a number of postwar European democracies and were 
empowered to review legislation’s compatibility with constitutional values.20 
Greater judicial power was not just apparent in the realm of constitutional 
politics and rights but also in more routine areas of economic regulation. With 
the growing complexity of public regulation in the postwar era, the production 
of regulatory norms shifted more and more from parliament to executive 
departments and administrative agencies, and national constitutional courts 
were called on to monitor this transfer of authority.21 The role of courts in 
regulatory governance intensified further beginning in the 1980s, when many 
European countries moved to privatize state owned enterprises and to liberalize 
previously sheltered markets.22 In doing so, Europeans set up new systems of 
regulation to control these privatized and liberalized sectors.23 These reforms 
replaced restrictions on market entry and direct state control with rule-based, 
highly judicialized regulatory regimes that invited judges to regulate markets 
that previously had been controlled by bureaucrats.24 
Thus, the assertions of authority by the ECJ from the 1960s to 1980s 
occurred in a political context that was experiencing a more general trend 
toward a greater judicialization of politics and policymaking, including stronger 
judicial protection of fundamental rights.25 EU member states were democracies 
not only committed to the rule of law; they were also increasingly accepting of 
judicial power. Member-state acceptance of the growing authority of the ECJ 
and of the supranational judicial system it helped to construct in partnership 
with national judges must be understood against this new domestic acceptance 
of judicial power. The ECJ helped promote this wave of judicialization, but it 
also benefited from riding the wave. In this context, for a government to defy 
the ECJ’s authority outright or to interfere with the ECJ’s relationship with the 
national courts who applied its judgments would have raised questions not just 
about that government’s commitment to European integration but also about 
 
 19.  STONE SWEET, supra note 6, at 31–38; Shapiro & Stone, supra note 6, at 400–01.   
 20.  STONE SWEET, supra note 6, at 40–49. 
 21.  See generally PETER L. LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND 
THE NATION-STATE (2010). 
 22.  See generally Giandomenico Majone, The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe, 17 W. EUR. 
POL. 77 (1994).  
 23.  Id. 
 24.  KELEMEN, supra note 11, at 22–23.  
 25.  Mikael Rask Madsen, Human Rights and European Integration: From Institutional Divide to 
Convergent Practice, in A POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF TRANSNATIONAL EUROPE 147 (Niilo Kauppi 
ed., 2013).  
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its commitment to the rule of law, judicial independence, and fundamental 
rights, which, at the time, governments were eager to demonstrate. 
Many aspects of the geopolitical context that supported the expansion of the 
ECJ’s authority in the first few decades of European integration remain in place 
today. The basic structural features of the EU continue to encourage lawmakers 
to rely on a judicialized mode of governance. Indeed, this dynamic has grown 
even more pronounced in recent years as the EU’s administrative capacity has 
failed to keep pace with its growing legislative ambitions. Just as the EU relied 
heavily on the Court when the scope of its competences was limited primarily to 
economic policy, so too has the EU continued to rely on the ECJ as it has 
extended its reach into more and more policy areas.26 Also, the gradual 
enlargement of the EU from six to twenty-eight member states has exacerbated 
the joint-decision trap, making it harder for member states to assemble the 
coalitions needed to rein in the ECJ and thus further insulating the ECJ from 
political overrides.27 
Although the overall geopolitical context remains supportive, some recent 
developments pose risks to the ECJ. Support for an international court’s 
authority is tied to support for the regional integration project with which the 
Court is associated. In the wake of the Eurozone crisis, public support for the 
EU hit an all-time low,28 and commentators from across the political spectrum 
questioned the long-term viability of the European project.29 Support for the 
ECJ is not immune from this trend, and trust in the ECJ in fact declined 
somewhat in the years since the eruption of the Eurozone crisis.30 Further 
erosion of public support for the EU would pose a long-term risk to the ECJ. 
Nevertheless, trust in the ECJ has declined less than has trust in other EU 
institutions or national political institutions.31 The ECJ remains today, as it has 
long been, the most trusted of all government institutions assessed in 
Eurobarometer surveys—including national governments, national parliaments, 
national political parties, national courts, and other EU institutions.32 Beyond 
risks associated with general declines in support for European integration, 
recent EU enlargement to states with weaker judiciaries and rule-of-law 
traditions poses another set of new challenges to the Court—challenges 
explored further in part IV. Before considering the ECJ’s relationships with 
 
 26.  See KELEMEN, supra note 11, at 24 (on the EU’s reliance on the ECJ and judicialized modes of 
governance “across a wide range of policy areas”).  
 27.  See R. Daniel Kelemen, Anand Menon & Jonathan Slapin, Wider and Deeper? Enlargement 
and Integration in the European Union, 21 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 647, 658–59 (2014) (arguing that while 
EU enlargement has to some degree increased legislative gridlock, this has in turn increased the ECJ’s 
room for maneuver). 
 28.  Ian Traynor, Crisis for Europe as Trust Hits Record Low, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/24/trust-eu-falls-record-low.  
 29.  Matthias Matthijs & R. Daniel Kelemen, Europe Reborn, 94 FOREIGN AFF. 96, 97 (2015).  
 30.  See European Commission, L’Opinion Publique dans l’Union Européene, 79 
EUROBAROMÈTRE STANDARD 90 (2013). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id.; see also Kelemen, supra note 14. 
KELEMEN_1-8 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2016  11:10 AM 
124 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79:117 
national courts and other constituencies, however, we first consider the impact 
that the ECJ’s original core subject matter, the Single Market, had on the 
expansion of its authority. 
III 
THE SINGLE MARKET AS A CORE SUBJECT MATTER 
The successful expansion of the ECJ’s authority depended not simply on the 
fact that it was embedded in a project of regional integration; rather, it 
depended quite specifically on the fact that in its early years this project was, 
above all, one of market integration. Market integration proved to be a fertile 
subject matter competence for the expansion of ECJ authority for two main 
reasons: First, it enabled the ECJ to establish the core doctrines of the EU legal 
system in cases involving issues often of relatively low political salience, and 
second, the dynamics of market integration enabled the ECJ to trigger a cycle 
of deregulation and reregulation that served to expand the corpus of EU law—
and with it, the ECJ’s authority. Even today, the core of EU law remains 
focused on the ongoing construction of a single market, and this subject matter 
focus continues to bolster the expansion of the Court’s authority. However, as 
the scope of EU law has expanded into more sensitive areas of national policy, 
such as healthcare, education, collective bargaining, fundamental rights, and 
fiscal policy, the ECJ has been drawn into fields where its decisions are more 
likely to spark public outcries and political reprisals. The ECJ’s authority today 
may be sufficiently robust to weather the criticisms that come from involvement 
in such controversial areas, but it was able to achieve this authority only 
because it started out focused on seemingly technocratic—and therefore less 
politically salient—issues of market integration. 
First, the ECJ’s focus on market integration generally led it to intrude on 
less politically contentious issues than those faced by some other international 
courts, such as those focused on human rights. Many ECJ decisions did impose 
high costs on particular member states and proved highly controversial. But on 
the whole, the focus on market integration helped the ECJ hide behind a veil of 
technocracy. The ECJ was able to establish landmark legal doctrines in cases 
that often involved technical, market-integration issues of low political salience, 
ranging from the classification of chemicals for the purpose of customs duties33 
to rules concerning the protection of employees in the event of their employer’s 
insolvency.34 This technocratic focus helped the ECJ use the law more 
effectively as a “mask and shield” for the broader political transformation of 
Europe that the Court was promoting.35 
 
 33.  Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 
1. 
 34.  Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich and Bonifaci v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. I-
5357. 
 35.  Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal 
Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41, 44, 72 (1993). 
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Second, the focus on the common market enabled the ECJ to unleash a 
cycle of “negative integration” and “positive integration” that drove the EU 
forward—and, in the process, enhanced the Court’s authority.36 The 
establishment of a common or single market involves both negative integration, 
the elimination of barriers to trade, and positive integration, the introduction of 
common rules. Courts play a direct role in negative integration when they strike 
down regulations that constitute nontariff barriers to trade between 
jurisdictions. Positive integration requires lawmakers to adopt common 
regulatory standards that apply across all jurisdictions in the common market. 
But even here courts play a role. When court-led negative integration strikes 
down existing regulations at the state level (deregulation), lawmakers often 
respond by introducing common standards to apply to all states (re-regulation). 
As noted above, when lawmakers do re-regulate in the context of a political 
system like the EU’s, they will often do so in a way that invites courts to play a 
strong role in governance. In other words, lawmakers couple national 
deregulation with supranational, judicialized re-regulation. 
In many areas of policymaking related to the Single Market, purely 
deregulatory, negative market integration is politically unacceptable. If the ECJ 
strikes down national regulations on issues such as food safety, environmental 
protection, or financial services because such regulations constitute nontariff 
barriers to trade, this is not the end of the story. Voters and national politicians 
will quite simply reject an outcome in which national regulatory regimes are 
gutted and consumers are left vulnerable. Instead, judicial rulings striking down 
national regulatory barriers to trade generate political pressure for the 
establishment of common, EU-wide regulations. This cycle of negative 
integration spurring positive integration has played out again and again in many 
regulatory areas connected to the Single Market. In fact, member governments 
have repeatedly proved willing to surrender their veto over fields of legislation 
that have been affected by judicial negative integration, in part so that they 
could facilitate the process of passing positive integration legislation at the EU 
level.37 So, while the ECJ has promoted market liberalization that has 
eliminated some national social regulations, it has also promoted a legislative 
countermovement of historic proportions in the form of a massive accumulated 
body of EU legislation and rulemaking, the acquis communautaire, that 
 
 36.  ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 108–45 (2004). On the 
concepts of negative integration and positive integration more generally, see Fritz Scharpf, Negative 
and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States, in  GOVERNANCE IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 15 (Gary Marks, Fritz Scharpf, Philippe Schmitter & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1996). 
 37.  This contradicts some elements of Weiler’s equilibrium thesis. See Alec Stone Sweet & R. 
Daniel Kelemen, Assessing the Transformation of Europe: A View from Political Science, in THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE: 25 YEARS ON (Miguel Maduro & Marlene Wind eds., forthcoming 
2016); Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100YALE L. J. 2403 (1991). Moreover, 
Caporaso and Tarrow have linked this dynamic in the EU to Karl Polanyi’s insights concerning how 
destabilizing market liberalization can spark countermovements designed to re-embed markets in a 
social context. James A. Caporaso & Sydney Tarrow, Polanyi in Brussels: Supranational Institutions 
and the Transnational Embedding of Markets, 63 INT’L. ORG. 593 (2009). 
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establishes uniform EU-level regulations. 
Challenging this view, many critics of the EU on the left claim that the EU 
promotes a neoliberal agenda, in part because its capacity for negative 
integration driven by the ECJ exceeds its capacity for positive integration by 
EU lawmakers.38 Although it is true that the EU’s capacity for negative 
integration often exceeds its capacity for positive integration, the EU has far 
more capacity for positive integration—that is, passing legislation—than any 
other supranational organization. In fact, the EU has demonstrated more 
capacity for the adoption of common regulations than most states, with its 
acquis communautaire regulating most aspects of economic activity in EU 
member states.39 The passage of a vast body of EU directives and regulations, in 
turn, expanded the body of EU law over which the ECJ was the ultimate 
judicial authority. In this way, the cycle of deregulation at the national level 
followed by re-regulation at the EU level related to the single market enabled 
the ECJ to extend its authority into a wide range of areas. 
On the whole, the focus on market integration has been extremely 
conducive to the development of the ECJ’s authority; nevertheless, the 
extension of the EU’s competences into new, more sensitive policy areas raises 
new challenges for the ECJ. As EU law has expanded further into politically 
charged policy areas ranging from healthcare to education, immigration, 
fundamental rights, and fiscal and monetary policy, the ECJ has been pressed 
into new terrain where its decisions are more likely to spark public outcries and 
political reprisals. For instance, a string of ECJ rulings, the so-called Laval 
quartet,40 in which the ECJ was asked to weigh national social rights against the 
EU’s liberal economic freedoms, led to widespread denunciation of the Court 
by critics on the left.41 And the reference recently sent to the ECJ by the 
German Constitutional Court in the divisive Gauweiler case42 has forced the 
ECJ into potentially explosive terrain.43 Beyond the sphere of socioeconomic 
 
 38.  See, e.g., Martin Höpner & Armin Schäfer, Embeddedness and Regional Integration: Waiting 
for Polanyi in a Hayekian Setting, 66 INT’L. ORG. 429, 448 (2012) (“[T]he ECJ drives forward market 
liberalization . . . while member state heterogeneity makes both political agreement on harmonization 
and political override of ECJ decisions unlikely.”); Fritz W. Scharpf, Legitimacy in the Multilevel 
European Polity, 1 EUR. POL. SCI. REV. 173, 193–94 (2009). 
 39.  See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 19–35 (2012) (highlighting the 
expansive reach of EU regulation and noting that the EU often adopts the strictest regulatory 
standards in the world and frequently determines global standards). 
 40.  Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri, 2007 E.C.R. I-11767; Case C-438/05 Int’l Transport Workers 
Federation and Finnish Seaman’s Union v. Viking, 2007 E.C.R. I-10779; Case C-319/05, Commission of 
the European Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany , 2007 E.C.R. I-4323; Case C-346/06, Dirk 
Rueffert v. Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-1989. 
 41.  See Michael Blauberger, With Luxembourg in Mind… The Remaking of National Policies in 
the Face of ECJ Jurisprudence, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 109, 109 (2012). 
42.    Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others v. Deutscher Bundestag, not yet published (responding to 
the German Constitutional Court’s questions on the legality of the Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) bond-buying program put in place by the European Central Bank to stabilize the monetary 
union and ruling that the program is in fact compatible with the EU treaties). 
 43.  See Erik Jones & R. Daniel Kelemen, The Euro Goes to Court, 56 SURVIVAL: GLOBAL POL. 
& STRATEGY 15, 17 (2014); see also Opinion Of Advocate General Cruz Villalón, Case C-62/14, 
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rights and policies, the increasing intervention of the EU and the ECJ in the 
field of fundamental human rights since the formal adoption of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the Lisbon Treaty has also generated many 
controversial new cases.44 The EU’s likely upcoming accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights would bring new fields of fundamental rights 
cases before the ECJ. These cases could provoke for the ECJ the same sort of 
political backlash they already have provoked for the European Court of 
Human Rights, and they could trigger clashes between this court and ECJ as to 
which is the ultimate supranational arbiter of human rights in Europe.45 
IV 
CONSTITUENCIES CONTEXT 
In addition to a favorable geopolitical context and a subject matter 
jurisdiction conducive to judicial empowerment, the ECJ has long benefited 
from the fact that the key actors it has engaged—including national 
governments, national courts, and members of the European legal field—have 
been generally favorable to increases in the Court’s authority. However, 
developments over the last decade, particularly ones related to EU 
enlargement, have given rise to a new set of challenges to ECJ authority. 
A. National Governments 
The national governments of EU member states, of course, constitute a 
crucial aspect of the ECJ’s external context. After all, governments created the 
ECJ, appoint its judges,46 and enforce its rulings. Much of the literature on 
European legal integration has treated national governments as a brake on the 
ECJ’s ambitions.47 According to this view, the supranationalist ECJ consistently 
 
Gauweiler et al. v. Deutscher Bundestag, Jan. 14, 2015; R. Daniel Kelemen, On the Unsustainability of 
Constitutional Pluralism: European Supremacy and the Survival of the Eurozone, MAASTRICT J. EUR. 
& COMP. LAW (forthcoming 2016).  
 44.  For a review of ECJ case law since the Charter became a legally binding instrument of EU law, 
see generally Gráinne de Búrca, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a 
Human Rights Adjudicator?, 20 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. LAW 168 (2013).  
 45.  See generally Tobias Lock, The ECJ and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship between the Two 
European Courts, 8 L. & PRAC. INT’L CTS & TRIB. 375 (2009) (exploring the likely future relationship 
between the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)); Mikael Rask Madsen, The 
Challenging Authority of the European Court of Human Rights: From Cold War Legal Diplomacy to the 
Brighton Declaration and Backlash,  LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2016, at 167; Voeten, supra note 
7, at 418 (showing that recent ECtHR rulings on controversial cases have led to a dramatic decline in 
public support for the ECtHR in the United Kingdom). Also, for an illustration of potential conflict 
between the ECJ and the ECtHR, see the recent ECJ ruling rejecting the draft agreement on the EU’s 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, Opinion 2/13, (Dec. 18, 2014). 
 46.  See R. Daniel Kelemen, Selection, Appointment and Legitimacy: A Political Perspective, in 
SELECTING EUROPE’S JUDGES 253–56 (Michael Bobek ed., 2015) (detailing recent changes in the 
appointment procedure for ECJ justices including the fact that an expert committee composed of a 
majority of national judges now influences the process through which national governments select ECJ 
judges). 
 47.  See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, Who Are the “Masters of the Treaty”?, European Governments and the 
European Court of Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121 (1998); Burley & Mattli, supra note 35; Geoffrey Garrett, 
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seeks to enhance its power by expanding the scope of European law and 
accelerating the pace of European legal integration. Member states, by contrast, 
seek to apply intergovernmentalist brakes to the Court’s ambitions, pressuring 
the ECJ—through threats of legislative overrides, noncompliance, or other 
punishments—to temper its activism. Scholarly debates, then, tend to center on 
examining how and when the ECJ can overcome the efforts of member states to 
control its activism. For the most part, the literature on interactions between 
member governments and the ECJ has long since arrived at a general consensus 
that member governments set the outer bounds of how far the ECJ can push 
both its authority and the scope of European law but that within these bounds 
the ECJ has substantial room for maneuvering that it can use to promote 
deeper integration.48 
Scholars have put forward a number of arguments rooted in varieties of new 
institutionalism to explain why member governments often fail to constrain ECJ 
activism.49 The most powerful and frequently invoked explanations suggest that 
governments are hamstrung by the EU’s joint-decision trap50 in which the high 
threshold for reaching agreements prevents states from acting collectively to 
rein in the ECJ.51 Importantly, however, even among scholars who emphasize 
the limited ability of governments to rein in the ECJ, the prevailing assumption 
is that states do seek to act as a brake on the Court, to the limited extent they 
 
R. Daniel Kelemen & Heiner Schulz, The European Court of Justice, National Governments and Legal 
Integration in the European Union, 52 INT’L ORG. 149 (1998); Mark A. Pollack, Delegation, Agency, 
and Agenda Setting in the European Community, 51 INT’L ORG. 99 (1997); Alec Stone Sweet, The 
European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance, 5 LIVING REVIEWS EUR. 
GOVERNANCE 1, 16–22 (2010). 
 48.  Three articles published in a 1998 issue of International Organization set out the parameters of 
the consensus. See Alter, supra note 47; Burley & Mattli, supra note 35; Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz, 
supra note 47. Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla recently sought to resurrect a stronger 
intergovernmentalist account, claiming that the ECJ was systematically constrained by threats of 
override and noncompliance from member governments. See Clifford Carrubba, Matthew Gabel & 
Charles Hankla, Judicial Behavior Under Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of 
Justice, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 435 (2008). Stone Sweet and Brunell offer a more convincing analysis 
of Carrubba, Gabel, and Hankla’s data, however, arguing that the data actually suggest that 
governments placed few constraints on the Court. See Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunell, The 
European Court of Justice, State Noncompliance and the Politics of Override, 106 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
204 (2012). 
 49.  See, e.g., KAREN ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE 
MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001) (emphasizing in particular how the 
development of the ECJ’s relationships with national courts limited governments’ ability to constrain 
the ECJ); MARK POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (2003) (applying the logic of 
rational choice institutionalism and principal-agent theory to explain why member state ‘principals’ 
have difficulty controlling the ECJ and other supranational ‘agents’); Paul Pierson, The Path to 
European Integration, 29 COMP. POL. STUD. 123 (1996) (applying insights from historical 
institutionalism and path dependence to explain why member state governments fail to control the 
process of European integration). 
 50.  See supra text accompanying note 12.  
 51.  Scharpf, The Joint Decision Trap, supra note 12, at 39; see also Weiler, supra note 37, at 24, 26 
(arguing that the unanimity requirement for decisionmaking in the early European Community was the 
key to judicial empowerment). 
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can.52 
Although member-state governments have sometimes provided a kind of 
brake on the ECJ’s ambitions, setting outer limits to the pace and scope of its 
promotion of legal integration, this narrow perspective misses the bigger 
picture. In a larger sense, member-state governments have been great enablers 
of the ECJ. This truth stands out when considering the ECJ’s relationship with 
national governments from a comparative perspective. For example, many of 
the other international courts discussed in this issue interact with governments 
that include semi-authoritarian or authoritarian regimes with little commitment 
to the rule of law and marginal inclination toward real pooling of sovereignty. 
By comparison, the governments of EU member states seem to have been 
particularly receptive to its assertion of judicial power. 
Certainly, the ECJ has acted strategically to empower itself, extending its 
mandate more rapidly and taking it far beyond what many member-state 
governments originally envisaged. But one should not view governments simply 
as feckless brakemen unable to control the wily ECJ. Such an interpretation is 
implausible because member governments have repeatedly taken steps in new 
EU treaties to empower the ECJ, and they have done so despite the Court’s 
well-known propensity to push for deeper integration. To be sure, one can find 
rare instances in which member governments threatened the Court;53 took steps 
at intergovernmental conferences to limit the fall-out from ECJ rulings, such as 
adding the Barber Protocol to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty;54 or attempted to 
shield sensitive policy areas from ECJ influence such as by restricting ECJ 
jurisdiction over ‘Third Pillar’ Justice and Home Affairs issues in the Maastricht 
Treaty. But much more common have been steps taken by the member-state 
governments at intergovernmental conferences to expand the power of the 
ECJ. 
In every round of EU treaty revision, the member states have extended the 
ECJ’s jurisdiction to new fields of law. They have extended the Court’s reach 
well beyond the sphere of the single market to include more sensitive areas such 
as “Justice and Home Affairs,”55 some areas of foreign and security policy,56 and 
fiscal surveillance.57 Indeed, the 2012 Fiscal Compact Treaty58 relies on the ECJ 
 
 52.  See, e.g., Kelemen, supra note 14, at 45–47; Stone Sweet supra note 47, at 16–22. 
 53.  See, e.g., HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
354–56 (1986) (discussing a court packing plan proposed by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1980); Alter, 
supra note 47, at 130 (discussing proposals by British Conservatives in 1991 and 1995 that call for limits 
to the jurisdiction of the ECJ and the establishment of a political body that could veto its rulings).  
 54.  Garrett, Kelemen & Schulz, supra note 47, at 166–67. 
 55.  See generally STEVE PEERS, EU JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS LAW (3d ed. 2011); Jörg 
Monar, Justice and Home Affairs, 52 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 141 (2014). 
 56.  See generally DEVELOPMENTS IN EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW (Marise Cremona ed., 
2008); THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW—CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES (Marise Cremona & Anne Thies eds., 2014).  
 57.  Deborah Mabbett & Waltraud Schelkle, Searching Under the Lamp-Post: The Evolution of 
Fiscal Surveillance (London Sch. of Econ., LEQS Paper No. 75, 2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2434008##.  
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to provide judicial review of the adequacy of member-state, balanced-budget 
arrangements that are the centerpiece of that treaty. Likewise, member 
governments have granted the ECJ new enforcement powers to increase the 
bite of its rulings, such as the ability to impose penalty payments on 
governments that fail to comply with previous ECJ rulings.59 Finally, the 
member governments have dramatically increased the ECJ’s capacity to process 
cases by adding judges to the ECJ60 and by establishing subsidiary courts. In the 
1986 Single European Act, member states endorsed the creation of a Court of 
First Instance, which is now the General Court, beneath the ECJ, effectively 
doubling the size of the EU’s judiciary.61 Governments endorsed further 
expansion of the EU judiciary again in the Nice Treaty, which entered into 
force in 2003.62 The Nice Treaty empowered EU lawmakers to set up specialized 
judicial panels, now called Specialized Courts, in specific areas of law. The first 
such panel, the Civil Service Tribunal, was established in 2005. 
Why have member-state governments repeatedly empowered the ECJ 
despite their occasional complaints about its pro-integration judicial activism? 
First, and most importantly, member-state governments believed and continue 
to believe that, in order for their project of political and economic integration to 
succeed, they need a powerful court to help them overcome collective action 
problems and to make their commitments credible by enforcing their 
agreements and maintaining the rule of law within the EU.63  Many member 
states may be unhappy with particular ECJ decisions, but they still collectively 
recognize that they need the ECJ if the EU is to operate successfully. 
Second, the Court has facilitated the acceptance of its expansive 
jurisprudence by engaging in “majoritarian activism.”64 The Court has been 
activist by consistently promoting deeper legal integration, but its activism has 
focused on imposing norms favored by the majority of member states on the 
minority.65 This does not mean that the ECJ is bowing to the pressure of 
 
 58.  Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, art. 
8(1), Mar. 2, 2012. 
 59.  See, e.g., TFEU art. 260, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 (on the procedure for the 
imposition of penalty payments for non-compliance with ECJ rulings); Brian Jack, Article 260(2) 
TFEU: An Effective Judicial Procedure for the Enforcement of Judgements?, 19 EUR. L. J. 404 (2013) 
(discussing revisions in the Lisbon Treaty designed to facilitate use of the penalty payments procedure 
and ongoing problems with it). 
 60.  The ECJ has been composed of one judge appointed by each member state, which has allowed 
the Court to grow with each enlargement of the EU. See Kelemen, supra note 46, at 253–56. 
 61.  R. Daniel Kelemen, Constructing the European Judiciary (2013) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author). 
 62.  Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties Establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Mar. 10, 2001 O.J. C 80/1.  
 63.  See MORAVCSIK, supra note 6, at 73–77 (highlighting the need for credible commitment as a 
motivation for governments to delegate considerable authority to institutions charged with 
adjudication). 
 64.  MIGUEL MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION 11 (1998). 
 65.  Id. 
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particular governments. Rather, it means that in seeking to develop common 
legal norms around which to integrate diverse national legal orders, the ECJ 
often imposes on the minority the norms favored by the majority of legal 
systems. Thus, by encouraging an increase in the ECJ’s authority, member 
states empowered a body that could consistently be expected to impose the will 
of the majority of states on the minority. 
EU member governments have provided a mostly supportive external 
constituency for the Court, but worrying signs loom on the horizon. The EU’s 
2004 enlargement added to the Union a number of relatively new democracies 
in which commitment to judicial independence and the rule of law was not well 
established. In part, this lack of commitment to judicial independence and the 
rule of law has manifested itself in deficiencies in young democracies’ 
judiciaries66 and, at least in the case of Hungary, both in the government’s 
systematic flouting of EU law and fundamental values and in outright attacks 
on judicial independence. In the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary election, Viktor 
Orbán’s Fidesz Party won a two-thirds supermajority that enabled his 
government not only to push through its legislative agenda but also to amend 
Hungary’s constitution. Since then, Orbán’s government has introduced a new 
constitution, eliminated democratic checks and balances, installed party 
loyalists in previously independent government positions, undermined 
independence in the judiciary and the media, and introduced a new election law 
designed to favor his party.67 These moves have been widely criticized by 
international organizations such as the European Parliament68 and the Council 
of Europe’s Venice Commission,69 by nongovernmental organizations such as 
Human Rights Watch,70 and by academic observers.71 
In response to developments in Hungary, the Commission turned to its 
traditional toolkit, bringing a series of infringement actions before the ECJ 
against the Hungarian government for violations of particular directives and 
regulations.72 And though the Hungarian government has not explicitly denied 
the ECJ’s authority in these cases, it has played a game of cat and mouse with 
the Commission and Court, systematically working to avoid compliance with 
EU law. The enforcement of ECJ judgments has always had shortcomings, and 
many member states have tried to delay or avoid compliance with particularly 
 
 66.  See infra notes 96–101 and accompanying text. 
 67.  Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary and the End of Politics, THE NATION (May 26, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/hungary-and-end-politics/. 
 68.  See PARL. EUR. DOC. (2012/2130(INI)) (2013) (The Tavares Report). 
 69.  See Venice Commission, Adopted Opinions for “Hungary,” http://www.venice.coe.int/web 
forms/documents/?country=17&year=all.  
 70.  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WRONG DIRECTION ON RIGHTS: ASSESSING HUNGARY’S NEW 
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS (2013). 
 71.  See R. Daniel Kelemen, Judicialization, Democracy and European Integration, 49 
REPRESENTATION 295, 300 (2013); Jan-Werner Müller, Eastern Europe Goes South, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 
14 (2014); Scheppele, supra note 67. 
 72.  European Commission Press Release, IP/12/24, Jan. 17, 2012. 
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costly rulings.73 The scale of systematic resistance on display in Hungary, 
however, is unprecedented, and the EU legal order thus far seems unable to 
bring the Hungarian government to heel. 
This inability was made most clear when the Orbán government sought to 
purge the Hungarian judiciary of senior judges who might have presented 
impediments to its political agenda and to replace them with party loyalists.74 
The government achieved this by reducing the judicial retirement age from 
seventy to sixty-two. EU officials saw this as an attack on judicial independence 
and the rule of law in Hungary, and, lacking legal tools with which to directly 
challenge the Hungarian government for undermining the independence of the 
judiciary, they used a tool they did have at their disposal—the age-
discrimination provisions of the Equal Treatment Framework Directive75—to 
bring an age-discrimination based infringement action against Hungary before 
the ECJ. This legal strategy succeeded: the ECJ ruled against the Hungarian 
government in the infringement case.76 Nevertheless, the Hungarian 
government was able to prevent the judges in question from returning to their 
previous posts because new judges had already filled the positions. Complying 
with the decision by offering the more senior judges monetary compensation or 
alternative less significant judicial postings, the Hungarian government 
succeeded in its ambition to stack the judiciary.77 
This episode in Hungary illustrates the limits of the case-by-case 
infringement procedure in combatting systematic efforts by a member 
government to undermine the rule of law and the domestic application of EU 
law.78 The fact that the Hungarian government has continued to defy the EU, 
with Orbán declaring publicly his intention to abandon the EU’s brand of 
liberal democracy in favor of building an “illiberal new state,”79 shows that 
however extensive the contemporary ECJ’s authority, it remains vulnerable to 
defiance by individual governments. 
 
 73.  See Jack, supra note 59, at 406. 
 74.  Kim Lane Scheppele, Professor of Sociology and International Affairs, Princeton, What Can 
the European Commission Do When Member States Violate Basic Principles of the European Union? 
The Case for Systemic Infringement Actions, paper presented before the European Comm’n, Assises 
de la Justice 21–22 (Nov. 2013) (providing a detailed account of the outcome in the conflict over judicial 
retirement ages in Hungary);  Kim Lane Scheppele, First, Let’s Pick All the Judges, N.Y. TIMES, 
CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL BLOG (March 10, 2012, 11:32 AM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes 
.com/2012/03/10/first-lets-pick-all-the-judges/?_r=0 (analyzing the Hungarian government’s efforts to 
restructure the judiciary through changing the retirement age for judges). 
 75.  Council Directive 2000/78/EC O.J. (L303). 
 76.  Case C-286/12, Commission v. Hungary 2013, 1 CMLR 44. 
 77.  See Scheppele, What Can the European Commission Do When Member States Violate Basic 
Principles of the European Union?, supra note 74. 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Editorial, A Test for the European Union, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/opinion/a-test-for-the-european-union.html?_r=0. 
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B. National Courts 
It can be lonely at the top, especially lonely if those who you view as your 
subordinates do not recognize you as their superior. When the ECJ was created, 
there was every reason to believe it might remain lonely in Luxembourg, 
receiving few cases and winning little respect from the national courts charged 
with enforcing European law within their jurisdictions. National courts 
constituted a key element of the ECJ’s external context; winning their respect, 
their acceptance of its legal doctrines, and their cooperation in the construction 
of the European judicial order was crucial for the ECJ’s development. The 
ECJ’s success in promoting European legal integration would be unthinkable in 
the absence of its constructive relationship with national courts, which refer 
cases to the Court via the preliminary ruling procedure and which enforce EU 
law in cases that come before them. But as constructive as the ECJ’s 
relationship with national courts is overall, the relationship has always been 
fraught with tensions regarding particular national courts and particular issues. 
Some of the tensions that emerged early on persist to this day, and new ones 
have surfaced with the enlargement of the EU’s membership and the expansion 
of the scope of its jurisdiction. 
The remarkable story of how the ECJ gradually secured the support and 
cooperation of national courts is well known.80 From multiple nuanced accounts 
of the development of the relationship between the ECJ and national courts 
emerges a prevailing narrative: the “judicial empowerment thesis.”81 The story 
begins with a peculiarity of the EU’s founding treaty. Article 177 of the Treaty 
of Rome82 established the so-called preliminary ruling procedure, a procedure 
whereby any national court hearing a case requiring it to interpret a provision 
of European Community law could send a reference to the European Court of 
Justice asking it to interpret the provision of law in question. After receiving a 
judgment from the ECJ, the national court could then apply the ECJ’s 
interpretation in the case before it. 
The judicial empowerment thesis argues that many national courts saw 
cooperation with the ECJ via the preliminary ruling procedure as a means to 
promote judicial power at the national level vis-à-vis other branches of 
government. Also, many lower courts saw the ECJ as a potentially powerful 
judicial ally outside and above the rest of their national judicial hierarchy. 
Referring cases directly to the ECJ allowed lower national courts to circumvent 
higher courts within their own jurisdiction that might have otherwise 
overturned the lower courts’ rulings on appeal.83 Those dynamics gave many 
 
 80.  See, e.g., ALTER, supra note 49; STONE SWEET, supra note 36; Burley & Slaughter, supra note 
35; Weiler, supra note 37. 
 81.  For a review of this literature, see Alec Stone Sweet, The European Court of Justice and the 
Judicialization of EU Governance, 5 LIVING REVIEWS IN EU GOVERNANCE 1, 29 (2010). 
 82.  Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 177, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
11. 
 83.  See ALTER, supra note 49 (developing the inter-court competition model).  
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national courts an incentive to engage with the ECJ and to participate in the 
construction of European law. As the ECJ gradually strengthened its direct 
relationships with national courts across Europe, it became less and less 
plausible for national governments to resist the domestic application of EU law. 
To do so, these national governments would have had to challenge their own 
courts—challenges that would have created the impression of political 
interference with the independent judiciary. 
The ECJ was not passive in the process of judicial empowerment. The ECJ, 
along with other EU institutions, actively cultivated and supported the training 
of networks of national judges committed to European law who might send 
them cases through the preliminary ruling procedure and who would actively 
enforce EU law—sometimes against the wishes of those judge’s governments. 
Initially, the judges of the ECJ “court[ed] the national courts” through a 
somewhat ad-hoc mixture of “seminars, dinners, regular invitations to 
Luxembourg and visits around the community.”84  By now, the system for 
training national judges is far more established and systematic. In partnership 
with pan-European institutes such as the Academy of European Law, national 
judicial training bodies, and networks of judges such as the European Judicial 
Training Network, the Commission sponsors an extensive system to train 
national judges in European law.85 The Commission recently announced a goal 
of ensuring that at least half of the nearly eighty-thousand judges who staff the 
judiciaries of the EU’s twenty-eight member states receive training on EU law 
by 2020, and they claim to be on track to achieving that goal.86 Already, 
thousands of judges across the twenty-eight states of the EU participate in EU-
related judicial networks, engage with the EU courts in Luxembourg, and have 
been trained in European law. Also, the EU has made judicial reform and 
judicial training a central part of the enlargement process, with the ECJ and the 
EU’s political institutions working to socialize national judiciaries of new 
member states into the interlocking system of national and EU-level courts.87 
Although the ECJ has had great success in convincing national judiciaries to 
become central actors in the EU legal order, national courts did not come to 
support this legal order all at once or with equal enthusiasm.88  It was not until 
the 1990s that all national courts accepted fundamental doctrines—and the 
story of the relationship between the ECJ and national courts does not simply 
 
 84.  Burley & Mattli, supra note 35, at 62; see also RASMUSSEN, supra note 53, at 247 (explaining 
the ECJ’s campaign to educate national judges through all-expense-paid informational conferences).  
 85.  See Communication On Building Trust In EU-Wide Justice, COM (2011) 551 final (Sept. 13, 
2011); European Commission, Report On European Judicial Training 2011 (2012). 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  See generally DANIELA PIANA, JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITIES IN NEW EUROPE (2010); 
Kalypso Nicolaidis & Rachel Kleinfeld, Rethinking Europe’s “Rule of Law” and Enlargement Agenda 
(OECD Sigma Papers No. 49, 2012).  
 88.  See ALTER, supra note 49; THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND NATIONAL COURTS: DOCTRINE 
AND JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Street & J.H.H. Weiler eds., 1998) 
(providing case studies of the gradual acceptance of EU law in various national judicial orders). 
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end with the courts’ gradual acceptance of ECJ supremacy by the 1990s and the 
ECJ’s corresponding seamless conversion into a reliable guardian of EU law. 
Rather, considerable tensions between the ECJ and national constitutional 
courts remain over the question of which judicial authority should define the 
limits of the EU’s competence, and, in other respects as well, some national 
courts have pushed back against the ECJ’s assertions of authority. 
Even from the outset, some national courts only accepted the ECJ’s 
supremacy subject to qualifications. Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), was the most prominent dissenter, 
maintaining in its series of Solange judgments that it would treat EU law as 
supreme only so long as the EU guaranteed protection of fundamental rights as 
afforded under German constitutional law.89 The long-simmering tensions 
between the BVerfG and the ECJ are coming to a head in the context of the 
BVerfG’s recent reference—its first ever—to the ECJ in Gauweiler.90 The 
reference seems to have been crafted so as to force the hand of the ECJ to rule 
in a particular manner, implying that, if the ECJ failed to rule as the BVerfG 
deemed necessary, the BVerfG would defy the ECJ’s ruling.91 Now that the ECJ 
has ruled on the Gauweiler92 reference and provided broad backing for the 
Outright Monetary Transactions program, it remains to be seen whether the 
BVerfG will follow through on its threat of defiance or will simply accept the 
ECJ’s ruling. If the German Court openly defies the ECJ when it issues its own 
final ruling on the case, this would lead to a profound constitutional crisis for 
the EU. 
The BVerfG is hardly the only one pushing back against the ECJ and the 
EU legal order. Courts in Nordic member states continue to be reluctant to use 
the preliminary ruling procedure,93 and courts in some new Eastern European 
member states have shown similar reluctance.94 Likewise, courts in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland have challenged the ECJ on critical doctrines.95 
Even more worryingly, recent challenges to the independence of the judiciary in 
new EU member states have raised new questions about the ECJ’s ability to 
 
 89.  See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 357–63 
(2008) (discussing the German Court’s Solange cases). See generally BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (2012) (providing a more general account of development of the 
relationship between the ECJ and the German courts). 
 90.  See Gauweiler, supra note 42; see also supra text accompanying note 42. 
 91.  Jones & Kelemen, supra note 43. 
      92.   Gauweiler supra note 42. 
 93.  See Marlene Wind, The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance Towards Supranational Judicial 
Review, 48 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1039, 1046–55 (2010). 
 94.  Michal Bobek, Learning to Talk: Preliminary Rulings, the Courts of the New Member States 
and the Court of Justice, 45 COMMON. MKT. L. R. 1611, 1611 (2008).  
 95.  See Arthur Dyevre, Judicial Non-Compliance in a Non-Hierarchical Legal Order: Isolated 
Accident or Omen of Judicial Armageddon? (Max Planck Inst. for Int’l & Comparative Law, Working 
Paper, 2012),  http://works.bepress.com/arthur_dyevre1/7/ (arguing that challenges to ECJ doctrines 
posed by courts in new member states are not as threatening as challenges posed by higher profile 
courts such as the German Constitutional Court). See generally Wojciech Sadurski, ‘Solange, chapter 3’: 
Constitutional Courts in Central Europe – Democracy – European Union, 14 EUR. L. J. 1, 1 (2008). 
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depend on a potentially unreliable network of thousands of national courts to 
enforce European law. In addition to the Hungarian threats to judicial 
independence, Bulgaria and Romania have been plagued by judicial corruption 
and more general deficiencies in the functioning of their judiciaries so severe 
that, upon accession to the EU, the two states were subject to a special system 
of ongoing supervision of reform of their judiciaries—the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism.96 
The EU legal system relies heavily on decentralized enforcement before 
national courts, and the effectiveness of that model depends on the existence of 
independent national judiciaries willing to enforce European law even in the 
face of countervailing pressure from their governments. The Commission 
highlighted this dependence in the context of the dispute over the Hungarian 
government’s ousting of senior judges when it reminded the Hungarian 
government that whenever national courts apply EU law, they act as “Union 
courts” and need to meet EU minimum standards concerning judicial 
independence and effective judicial redress.97 But it remains questionable 
whether the EU can count on courts in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, or some 
other member states to act faithfully as “Union courts.” EU leaders in Brussels 
may need to stand up much more forcefully to some governments to make sure 
their judiciaries remain reliable partners for the European Court. In response to 
these new challenges, in March 2014, the Commission proposed a new rule-of-
law initiative to strengthen its ability to combat persistent threats to the rule of 
law in EU member states.98 The new framework is designed to bolster the EU’s 
existing Article 7 procedure, which allows the European Council to suspend the 
voting rights of a member state found to be in persistent breach of core EU 
values, including “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights.”99 The new rule of law initiative 
establishes a procedure with a series of steps that would incrementally ratchet 
up pressure on states on track to violate EU core values and trigger Article 7 
procedure, but it remains to be seen whether the Commission will deploy the 
new procedure. 
From the earliest days of the European Community legal order, national 
courts have been vital partners to the ECJ in extending the ECJ’s authority. 
The authority of the ECJ has surpassed that of other international courts not 
simply because it has secured more consistent compliance by governments but 
because it has more effectively penetrated national judicial orders. EU 
policymakers and the ECJ have embraced national courts as integral elements 
of the EU judiciary, insisting that they are not simply national courts but also 
 
 96.  See Milada Vachudova & Aneta Spendzharova, The EU’s Cooperation and Verification 
Mechanism: Fighting Corruption in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession, 2012 EUR. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS 1, 2 (2012). 
 97.  European Commission Press Release, Memo/12/165, Hungary – Infringements (Mar. 7 2012). 
 98.  Communication: A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM (2014) 158 final 
(Mar. 19, 2014).  
 99.  Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, arts. 2, 7, Oct. 26, 2012, C 326/15. 
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“‘ordinary’ courts within the European Union legal order.”100 As evidenced by 
the fact that use of the preliminary ruling procedure by national courts across 
the EU continues to increase steadily, the ECJ has had tremendous success in 
this respect.101  But while the EU has found many partners among national 
courts, the relationship between the ECJ and national judiciaries is, in some 
ways, rocky; the landscape remains marred by pockets of resistance. 
C. The Legal Field 
Courts exist in social contexts, sometimes called “legal fields,”102 which 
extend beyond governments and other political institutions and encompass a 
wide range of actors. Any legal field is a kind of local social order comprised of 
an interrelated system of actors, social positions, and institutions. The European 
legal field103 has formed a crucial part of the ECJ’s external context. This legal 
field is comprised not only of European and national judges and governments 
but also of the set of lawyers, academics, private litigants, firms, and NGOs 
involved in using, shaping, debating, and reacting to EU law. The emergence of 
an active and supportive European legal field has been crucial to the 
development of the ECJ and the European legal order more generally. The 
ECJ was not simply a passive beneficiary of the existence of the European legal 
field; it played an active role in constructing it, particularly in the early days of 
the EU legal system. That legal field, in turn, has played a crucial role in 
supporting the development of the ECJ’s authority. As the scope and impact of 
EU law grew, the European legal field expanded and diversified as well. While 
ECJ judges, European officials, and academics supportive of the Court were 
able to dominate most of the discourse about the Court in its early years, the 
expansion of the European legal field has brought with it more discordant 
voices that are critical of the ECJ and its jurisprudence. 
Historians, sociologists, and political scientists examining the foundations of 
the EU legal system have produced a rich empirical literature showing how a 
committed group of legal entrepreneurs—including not only officials from the 
ECJ, Commission, and Parliament, but also scholars and private practitioners—
worked to support the legitimacy of the ECJ’s jurisprudence and to establish 
European law as a distinct field of academic study and legal practice.104 
 
 100.  Case C-1/09, Creation of a unified patent litigation system, para. 80,  2011.  
 101.  KELEMEN, supra note 11, at 89.  
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What’s Missing?, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1257 (2013); see also Karen Alter, Jurist Advocacy 
Movements: The Role of Euro-Law Associations in European Integration (1953–1975), in THE 
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Members of this close-knit circle started academic associations to promote the 
discipline of European law.105 The Commission helped finance conferences, 
academic research centers, and new journals focusing on European law106 
whereas the staff of EU institutions and the private legal practitioners who 
interacted with them wrote many of the articles published in these new 
journals.107 ECJ jurisprudence gained legitimacy and expanded in scope in large 
part because the emergent European legal field, including academics and 
practitioners, endorsed the Court’s bold jurisprudence and its vision of EU law 
as not simply a form of international law but rather a new constitutional order. 
As legal historian Morten Rasmussen said, “The academic field of European 
law would play a key role in legitimising the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice.”108 
In the early years of the EU, the ECJ was blessed with “benign neglect by 
the powers that be and the mass media.”109 With so few people paying attention, 
ECJ justices and those closely affiliated with the Court were able to shape and 
dominate much of the discourse there was about the Court in the emerging 
legal field. They were able to encourage the spread of a “legal positivism” 
discourse that suggested the Court was not engaging in judicial activism but was 
simply fulfilling its mandate by “merely using legal interpretation to work out 
the details agreed to in the Treaty of Rome.”110 This helped generate a legal 
scholarship that was overwhelmingly supportive of the ECJ’s expansive, 
constitutional reading of the treaties. But this scholarship may have ignored 
political considerations and presented 
the Community as a juristic idea; the written constitution as a sacred text; the 
professional commentary as a legal truth; the case law as the inevitable working out of 
the correct implications of the constitutional text; and the constitutional court as the 
disembodied voice of right reason and constitutional teleology.111 
But the days of splendid isolation in which the Court could readily shape the 
discourse about itself are long past. The European legal field grew dramatically 
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over time—itself a testament to the Court’s growing authority. The twenty-first 
century ECJ is surrounded by an extensive and robust European legal field 
including dozens of journals specializing in European law, legions of scholars 
writing on European law, and thousands of lawyers and other members of the 
legal services industry focused on European law. But with that growth has come 
a far greater diversity of views; today, alongside supportive voices, the 
European legal field also produces many voices critical of the ECJ. When 
Hjalte Rasmussen wrote critically about the ECJ’s expansive judicial activism in 
1986, he was nearly a lone voice. Today, as ECJ judgments touch ever more 
sensitive policy areas, the ECJ is regularly met with scholarly critics on the right 
or on the left who accuse it of engaging in antidemocratic judicial activism.112 
New discourses have emerged among EU law specialists that support a vision of 
“constitutional pluralism,” which challenges the ECJ’s understanding of the 
supremacy of European law and favors a more heterarchical legal order in 
which the EU legal order and national legal orders coexist without the former 
being superior to the latter.113 
The proliferation of critical voices in the European legal field raises a 
question: Might the European legal field, which has so long supported the 
authority of the ECJ, come to act as an external constraint on the Court? Might 
criticisms of the ECJ emanating from the European legal field affect how 
political leaders, national judges, and the European public view the ECJ and 
react to its judgments? Any court that rules on controversial cases must expect 
to find itself the object of criticism. One might simply view the increasing 
criticisms of ECJ doctrine in the European legal field as an inevitable byproduct 
of the emergence of a robust and diverse European legal field and of the 
Court’s success in expanding its influence into ever more controversial policy 
areas. There is, however, cause for concern. Just as earlier academic literature 
legitimized the Court’s constitutional understanding of the EU legal order, the 
spread of academic literature endorsing constitutional pluralism and rejecting a 
strict judicial hierarchy could legitimize increasing defiance of the ECJ by 
national courts in the coming years. 
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V 
CONCLUSION 
Like any court, the ECJ has faced constraints in its external context, 
including constraints imposed by national governments and national courts. But 
overall, and particularly when regarded through the comparative lens embraced 
in this issue, the ECJ has benefited from a remarkably benign external 
environment. The ECJ has found much support from key actors including 
national governments, national courts, and members of the European legal 
field. When opposition to the Court has emerged, the institutional structure of 
the EU has helped insulate the ECJ against the variety of court-curbing 
measures that political opponents of judicial power often deploy in other 
contexts.114 As a result of this supportive context, the ECJ was able to establish 
the “extensive authority” discussed in the introduction to this issue.115 
Moreover, with the growth of EU law in covering more and more subject 
matters and with the enlargement of the EU to include more and more member 
states, the actual power exercised by the ECJ has become expansive.116 
The ECJ is—and for the foreseeable future will remain—the most powerful 
of the international courts examined in this issue. Nevertheless, looking 
forward, it is by no means clear that the ECJ’s external context will continue to 
support the expansion of its authority to the extent it has in the past. In the 
twenty-first century, the ECJ faces new contextual challenges in its relationship 
with member governments, national courts, and the European legal field. New 
member governments with fragile democracies and questionable commitments 
to the rule of law may increasingly test the extent to which they can defy or 
evade EU law without incurring a robust response from the EU. The delicate 
modus vivendi between the ECJ and national constitutional courts may also 
unravel as the obfuscation embodied in the concept of constitutional pluralism 
gives way to more open conflicts over the ultimate seat of judicial authority. 
Finally, the growth and diversification of the European legal field and the 
encroachment of EU law on increasingly sensitive policy areas is likely to 
provoke more intense criticism of the Court. Although the origins and historical 
development of the ECJ’s remarkable power are, by this point, well 
understood, future research will be needed to uncover how and to what degree 
the ECJ can maintain—or even expand—its authority in an increasingly 
challenging external context. 
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